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Marco Nicola Binetti Bremen Universität , Germany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2037-6454 Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2024, ogae044, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae044
Published:
28 November 2024
Article history
Received:
02 May 2024
Revision received:
08 August 2024
Accepted:
01 November 2024
Published:
28 November 2024
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Marco Nicola Binetti, Far from Home: The Impact of Corruption on Tactical Military Effectiveness, Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2024, ogae044, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae044
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Abstract
This article investigates how regime corruption affects the tactical military effectiveness of armies during clashes against violent non-state actors. It is posited that as armies operate further from their main logistic hub, regime corruption increasingly undermines their battlefield capabilities. In fact, corruption diminishes troops' skills and reduces the quality and quantity of their weapons, while as armies become more reliant on extended and strained supply lines, they become more vulnerable to inadequate equipment. To test this hypothesis, a range of multivariate Tobit, ordinary least squares (OLS), and multilevel regression analyses is employed, using data from engagements between armies and violent non-state actors worldwide between 1989 and 2021.
Resumen
Este artículo investiga cómo la corrupción de un régimen influye sobre la efectividad militar táctica de los ejércitos durante los enfrentamientos contra agentes no estatales violentos. Postulamos que, a medida que los ejércitos operan más lejos de su principal centro logístico, la corrupción del régimen deteriora, cada vez en mayor medida, sus capacidades en el campo de batalla. De hecho, la corrupción disminuye las capacidades de las tropas y reduce la calidad y la cantidad de sus armas. Además, a medida que los ejércitos se vuelven más dependientes de líneas de suministro que son extensas y están sobrecargadas, estos se vuelven más vulnerables al hecho de tener equipos inadecuados. Con el fin de poner a prueba esta hipótesis, empleamos una serie de análisis multivariados de Tobit, mínimos cuadrados ordinarios (MCO) y regresión multinivel. Para ello, utilizamos datos relativos a enfrentamientos entre ejércitos y agentes no estatales violentos en todo el mundo entre 1989 y 2021.
Résumé
Cet article s'intéresse à l'effet de la corruption d'un régime sur l'efficacité militaire tactique des armées lors d'affrontements avec de violents acteurs non étatiques. Nous postulons que plus les opérations militaires s’éloignent du principal centre logistique, plus la corruption d'un régime nuit à leurs capacités sur le champ de bataille. En fait, la corruption diminue les capacités des troupes et réduit la qualité et la quantité de leurs armes. Dans le même temps, puisque les armées se reposent de plus en plus sur de vastes chaînes d'approvisionnement tendues, leur vulnérabilité aux équipements inadéquats s'accroît. Pour évaluer cette hypothèse, nous employons un éventail d'analyses multivariées de régression multiniveaux, méthode des moindres carrés ordinaire (MCO) et Tobit, à l'aide de données issues des combats entre différentes armées et violents acteurs non étatiques du monde entre 1989 et 2021.
corruption, military effectiveness, conflict, civil war
corrupción, eficacia militar, conflicto, guerra civil
corruption, efficacité militaire, conflit, guerre civile
© The Author(s) (2024). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
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